

Democratic backsliding, attitudes towards democracy and affective polarization

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Abstract:

Affective polarization and partisanship have been posited as a key explanation for citizens' tolerance towards democratic backsliding, with voters more likely to overlook democratic violations conducted by in-party candidates. Our study adopts a novel perspective on this relationship: focusing on the role of the opposition, we contend that backsliding may crystallize an affective dislike among opposition supporters towards the governing party and its supporters that stems from a regime divide over democracy itself. To explore this argument, we leverage original survey data collected in Hungary and Poland. Our results point to a government-opposition divide in partisan affect and show how liberal democratic attitudes, especially among opposition party supporters, play into this dynamic. We submit that where backsliding persists over a longer period, this process can shift even multi-party systems towards increasing bipolarity along what we term a 'democratic divide.' Ultimately, our findings suggest that affective polarization may play a positive role in backsliding contexts by uniting the opposition around the defense of democracy.

Introduction

Politics in many societies are increasingly shaped by the strong affective responses of citizens to those who do not share their political beliefs. Scholars have studied this phenomenon as *affective polarization* (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012; Huddy and Bankert, 2017), an identity-based positive bias towards elites and supporters of one’s own party coupled with a dislike for rival parties and their supporters (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018).

While many negative outcomes have been ascribed to affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2019), one key concern is that partisan affect may increase tolerance for undemocratic behavior by governments (Kingzette et al., 2021; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018; Orhan, 2022; Giddengil, Stolle, and Bergeron-Boutin, 2021). According to this literature, affective polarization contributes to democratic erosion by increasing partisan loyalty and decreasing the importance citizens give to democratic procedures. More specifically, the strength of partisanship has also been found to be associated with ‘partisan double standard’ (Graham and Svobik, 2020) or ‘democratic hypocrisy’ (McCoy, Simonovits, and Littvay, 2020), i.e., the willingness to overlook democratic violations by one’s own party. Affective polarization and partisanship have thus been posited as a key explanation for citizens’ tolerance for democratic backsliding based on cross-sectional evidence pointing to a relationship between the two processes (Orhan, 2022).

We question the unidirectionality of this argument and contend that in countries that have experienced significant democratic backsliding, partisan affect may also be shaped by a regime divide over democracy itself. In her work on coalition formation in new democracies, Grzymala-Busse (2001) posits that a regime divide between Communist successor parties and their erstwhile opponents during democratic transition precludes cooperation across this divide, instead pushing parties to form coalitions within each camp despite ideological differences to avoid punishment by voters.

We extend this logic to the context of democratic backsliding. Rather than focusing on the detrimental impact of the affective divide upon citizens’ willingness to resist democratic violations, we argue that democratic backsliding may also forge a new regime divide that polarizes party evaluations around the very issue of liberal democracy itself. For citizens who prioritize liberal democratic values, a governing party that violates democratic norms and its supporters may become unacceptable. In turn, they may find other opposition parties and their supporters more acceptable, even when they disagree on policy grounds. Ultimately, an affective divide around democratic backsliding thus may drive opposition supporters to come together in defense

of democracy with a view to removing the ruling party from office.

Our argument looks beyond the role of government supporters in sustaining democratic backsliding to address the role of the opposition in responding to democratic violations by the incumbent party. In doing so, it provides a positive counterpoint to the prevalent critical perspective that highlights how affective polarization inhibits behaviors desirable for democracy and contributes to voters on either side of the affective divide tolerating backsliding by an in-group incumbent (Iyengar et al., 2019; Gidengil, Stolle, and Bergeron-Boutin, 2021; Pierson and Schickler, 2020). In contrast, our perspective suggests that support for democracy need not necessarily be undermined by affective polarization. Instead, democratic backsliding may effectively reinforce the commitment to democratic norms on one side of the affective divide, eventually favoring a joint mobilization by opposition groups. Hence, we suppose attitudes towards democracy to act as a potential transmission belt, with democracy becoming the very issue around which the affective divide is organized.

To explore this argument empirically, our pre-registered study addresses two central questions: first, to what extent does a given party's government participation - rather than its ideology - determine citizens' evaluations of it? Second, do divergent party evaluations among citizens signal a divide over democracy itself? We begin by tracing three stages of our theoretical argument in the case of Hungary, a particularly flagrant instance of democratic backsliding. In a second step, we explore the generalizability of our demonstration by repeating our analysis in Poland, another country named among the top autocratizers worldwide (Hellmeier et al., 2021). We draw on original survey data combining individual-level measures of partisan affect with information on respondents' vote choice and views of democracy. Using regression models, we examine the emergence of a regime divide structured along a distinct salience of democracy for opposition and government supporters.

Our findings lend support to our main contention that the erosion of democratic standards by the elected government may reinforce affective polarization among the electorate over the very issue of democracy itself. We demonstrate the existence of a government-opposition divide when it comes to voters' evaluations of other parties and show that liberal democratic attitudes form the main dividing line between government and opposition supporters. We also confirm our expectation that vote intention moderates the effect of democratic attitudes. Overall, our findings point to a potential positive role for partisan affect in contexts of democratic backsliding, with a 'democratic divide' allowing opposition groups to unite around their support for

democratic norms against the ruling party.

Affective polarization, partisan dynamics, and democratic backsliding

Affective polarization has attracted growing scholarly attention in recent years. Unlike ideological polarisation that describes a growing distance between voters on substantive issues (McCarty and McCarty, 2019), affective polarization revolves around social identity and the emotional attachment to one's own party along with the simultaneous dislike for out-parties and their sympathisers (Bernaerts, Blanckaert, and Caluwaerts, 2022; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012). It has been defined as “the increasing effect of partisanship on interpersonal affect” (Dias and Lelkes, 2021, 2). The bulk of research in this area has studied how deepening partisan identity among voters - and a corresponding dislike for supporters of other parties - divides society into distinct camps (Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 2015). While the term affective polarization is relational and refers to the gap between in- and out-party feelings, we focus upon partisan affect as the dimension that defines the level of affective polarization.

In the face of widespread concern over democratic backsliding, scholars have focused overwhelmingly on establishing how affective divides in the population may facilitate or deepen the erosion of democracy. For one, affective polarization has been associated with partisan bias in evaluations, with voters more willing to accept transgressions by politicians of their own party (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018; Graham and Svobik, 2020) or rationalizing democratic violations as being in accordance with democratic standards where such behavior aligns with their political preferences (Krishnarajan, 2022). Moreover, previous studies mention the politicization of democratic norms, such as checks and balances or opposition rights (Kingzette et al., 2021), which may decrease voters' willingness to punish extreme behavior by politicians of a party they identify with (Graham and Svobik, 2020; Pierson and Schickler, 2020). Finally, affective polarization makes extreme institutional reforms electorally viable, thereby potentially favouring the emergence of ‘closet autocrats’ while leaving citizens uncertain over an incumbent's true intentions (Chiopris, Nalepa, and Vanberg, 2021).

Unlike ideological polarization that may stimulate political competition, affective polarization is thus held to represent a risk to the democratic system (Reiljan, 2020), as intense inter-party animosity may favour democratic violations by the incumbent party or coalition and tolerance for such behaviour on the part of its supporters. Examining the macro-level relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding, Orhan (2022) argues that affective

polarization is key in driving support for undemocratic politicians by promoting cynicism, intolerance and blind partisan loyalty. Drawing on cross-sectional data from the V-Dem liberal democracy index, he shows that an increase in affective polarization is associated with the likelihood of democratic backsliding in the form of decreasing accountability, individual liberties and deliberation. Still, his argument is based upon aggregate rather than individual-level data and the causal direction of the relationship remains open to interpretation (Orhan, 2022, 724). In the following, we spell out the theoretical rationale for viewing the relationship as running also in the opposite direction, from democratic backsliding towards a deepening of partisan affect among citizens.

Theorizing an emergent regime divide around democracy

We propose a novel perspective on the relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding. Importantly, we do not contest previous studies that view affective polarization as contributing to democratic backsliding. Instead, we suggest that the relationship may be a two-way one, whereby affective polarization may promote tolerance for backsliding just as backsliding may foster affective polarization. Specifically, we suggest that for citizens who prioritize liberal democratic values, a governing party that violates democratic norms and its supporters may become unacceptable. In turn, they may find other opposition parties and their supporters more acceptable, even when they disagree on policy or ideological grounds. In a nutshell, we submit that democratic backsliding may foster deepening partisan affect among citizens that eventually amounts to what we term a ‘democracy divide.’ Figure 1 provides an overview of the circular relationship we expect between democratic backsliding and affective polarization.




Figure 1: Theoretical relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding

Given the ample literature addressing the linkage from affective polarization to democratic backsliding, we focus our theoretical discussion on the reverse direction. We develop our argument in three stages. Ultimately, we argue that democratic backsliding, by increasing the salience of voters' democratic preferences, may lead to affective polarisation around democratic values themselves, uniting opposition supporters in defence of democracy despite their ideological differences.

A new regime divide

Theoretically, our argument holds that undemocratic forms of government can structure political competition and foster a divide grounded in citizens' attitudes towards democracy. Such divergent democratic preferences have been shown to represent an important electoral divide particularly in new democracies, where "mass electorates are polarized according to their views on democracy and their support for pro-democratic and antidemocratic parties" (Moreno, 2019, 3). This 'democracy divide' echoes Grzymala-Busse's (2001) 'regime divide' in the context of post-communist democratization, whereby association with or opposition to the former communist system shapes party coalitions as well as electoral punishment. We expect a comparable divide to re-emerge in contexts of democratic backsliding, where democratic values as well as divergent evaluations of the state of democracy in the country once again become highly salient. Accordingly, we suggest that the ongoing erosion of democracy can shape a new regime divide that polarizes evaluations of parties and their supporters around attitudes towards democratic backsliding. Those who feel the government violates democratic norms will be unwilling to cross the government-opposition divide, while government supporters may seek to distance themselves from parties criticizing the government they support as undemocratic.

We focus our argument as well as our empirical analysis primarily on partisan affect among opposition supporters: while governments engaging in democratic backsliding have in many cases consisted of or at least been dominated by a single party, the opposition is often more heterogeneous. In fact, failure to coalesce among the opposition has frequently been identified as a central stumbling block for the defense of democracy (Selçuk and Hekimci, 2020; Ong, 2021). We posit that divergent attitudes towards democracy may unite opposition supporters against the ruling party, thus restructuring political competition along a new regime divide that concerns democracy itself.

As a first step, we expect to observe a government-opposition divide in feelings toward

supporters of other parties: citizens who vote for opposition parties should evaluate supporters of other opposition parties more positively than supporters of the government. Our argument here goes beyond merely establishing negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018), whereby opposition supporters evaluate the governing party critically. Instead, it is only when we also see positive evaluations of the supporters of (other) opposition parties that we observe the emergence of the expected regime divide. Our first hypothesis thus concerns the formation of a government-opposition divide:

Government-opposition hypothesis:

- **H1: Evaluations of party supporters follow a government-opposition divide.**

Our argument echoes research on the role of coalition signals for affective polarization (Praprotnik and Wagner, N.d.) showing that news reports about parties' willingness to enter a coalition decrease affective polarization by reducing the perceived ideological distance between parties. Similarly, Bantel (2023) and Hartevelde (2021) enlarge the typical focus on party-based affective polarization to the notion of broader camps around which partisan affect may be structured. They focus on ideological orientations when distinguishing such distinct camps, for instance examining respondents' feelings towards the larger group of 'leftists' rather than more specifically 'social democrats.' Adapting this approach to our argument, we contend that camps may correspond to different levels of liberal democratic commitment that distinguish supporters of the ruling party in a backsliding regime from supporters of a range of opposition parties.

Democracy and the regime divide

In principle, an affective divide along government-opposition lines may simply reflect incumbency and resentment among opposition supporters towards those in power. In a second step, we therefore propose to examine to what extent partisan affect relates substantively to respondents' democratic attitudes. If this is the case, as we suppose, those who value liberal democracy and strongly reject democratic backsliding should exhibit a stronger affective reaction towards the supporters of governing parties that violate democratic norms. Especially when opposition parties jointly object to such violations, we expect this to strengthen affective polarization between a government and opposition block. We thus theorize the emergence of a new regime divide whereby issue-based polarization around democracy fuels an affective divide between

government supporters and government opponents.

We expect this dynamic to play out in contexts where democratic backsliding is ongoing and carried out by a dominant ruling party or coalition. The resulting increased salience of democratic attitudes among voters is likely to affect their evaluation of different parties and their supporters, with democratic preferences overriding potential ideological differences among the opposition. We are specifically interested in whether respondents who hold a more liberal understanding of democracy evaluate supporters of the governing party more negatively and, in turn, opposition party supporters more positively, compared to those who care less about liberal democracy. Our second set of hypotheses thus expects respondents' democratic views to shape their evaluations of parties and their supporters.

Democracy hypotheses:

- **H2a: Respondents who have a liberal understanding of democracy feel more negatively towards ruling party supporters.**
- **H2b: Respondents who have a liberal understanding of democracy feel more positively towards supporters of opposition parties.**

Overall, we thus examine the interplay between democratic attitudes and partisan affect, exploring how the strength of liberal democratic commitment shapes voters' perceptions of different parties and their supporters. By formulating separate hypotheses for feelings towards the ruling party and the opposition, we also once again probe whether the hypothesized polarizing effect of democratic backsliding mostly occurs by creating an out-group that is loathed or can also occur by uniting an in-group of otherwise possibly disparate opposition parties.

Partisan dynamics and democratic views

In the final step of our argument, we examine whether vote intentions moderate the effect of a liberal understanding of democracy upon partisan effect. Previous research has shown that partisanship and polarization are often tightly connected, with processes of democratic backsliding increasing both polarization and the strength of partisanship (Laebens and Öztürk, 2021). It therefore makes sense to bring partisanship in as a variable that moderates the relationship we posit between democratic backsliding and affective polarization. Concretely, irrespective of voters' stated commitment to liberal democracy, we do not necessarily expect the effect of a liberal understanding of democracy to be universal. Indeed, a host of studies has provided evidence

of partisan-motivated reasoning (Ward and Tavits, 2019; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014), including when it comes to evaluations of democracy (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais and Gélinau, 2007) and democratic violations (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Mochtak, Lesschaeve, and Glaurdić, 2021). Hence, an identification with a governing party may bias citizens’ perspective, overriding the effect of our democracy hypotheses and leading to continued support for the ruling party.

In turn, we know that perceived intergroup threat tends to enhance partisan affect (Renström, Bäck, and Carroll, 2021, 555). Since opposition supporters are more likely to perceive the government and its supporters as a direct threat to their (democratic) interests, we expect the hypothesized effect of liberal democratic commitment upon partisan affect to concern primarily opposition supporters. To capture the differential impact of democratic attitudes upon partisan affect for government vs. opposition supporters, our last hypothesis thus concerns the moderating effect of vote intention upon this relationship.

Partisan hypothesis:

- **H3: Vote intention moderates the effect of a liberal understanding of democracy on feelings towards party supporters.**

In sum, we theorize a linkage from democratic backsliding towards the emergence of partisan affect along a government-opposition divide that is mediated by respondents’ democratic attitudes. We expect this relationship to be primarily driven by opposition supporters, whose commitment to liberal democracy leads them to develop negative feelings towards the ruling party and positive ones towards supporters of opposition parties, ultimately uniting the opposition camp in a joint defence of democracy. Figure 2 provides a visualization of our argument.




Figure 2: Relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding

Research Design & Data

We deliberately do not put forward a causal argument, but instead seek to develop an alternative theoretical narrative that highlights the two-way relationship between democratic backsliding and affective polarization. To explore the plausibility of the different stages of our purported reverse link from democratic backsliding towards deepening partisan affect around a democracy divide, we conduct two separate studies to assess how attitudes towards (liberal) democracy shape partisan affect. Our studies examine two European countries that have experienced protracted democratic backsliding: Hungary and Poland. Both countries constitute fairly advanced instances of democratic backsliding and have seen a politicization of democratic governance and deepening societal polarization (Vegetti, 2019; Fomina, 2019; Solska, 2020). To probe our hypotheses, we leverage data from two original surveys with a total sample of N=2'000 respondents in Hungary (Study 1) and N=2'700 in Poland (Study 2). Both surveys were conducted online among representative samples of the population (based on age, gender, size of town or region and vote choice in the last national election) and were fielded by YouGov's partner in Central-Eastern Europe, the Warsaw-based market research company Inquiry, between late 2021 and early 2022.

We pre-registered Study 1 before fielding the survey and later amended the pre-registration with our plan for Study 2 (based on secondary data collected previously by one of the authors), before analyzing the data.¹ Given the addition of the second study at a later stage, the measures of our variables differ somewhat between the two studies, as we describe in the following.

Empirical Strategy

As dependent variable, we draw on **evaluations of party supporters** (Study 1) **and parties** (Study 2) based on a feeling thermometer. Feeling thermometer scores are frequently used to operationalize affective polarization, including in the context of multi-party systems (Wagner, 2021; Reiljan, 2020). However, we focus on the evaluation themselves to avoid the distortions that the aggregation of measures into an affective polarization score would introduce. This is because measuring affective polarization in multi-party systems is significantly more complicated than in bipartisan contexts (Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2021) and the particularities of our case studies

¹The pre-analysis plan is available at https://osf.io/a8utq/?view_only=d033d451a3594360ad31907d0ce3e6f0

make classical measures of AP less meaningful.²

Given the independent origins of the data, the precise object of evaluation (party supporters, parties) and the scale (11-point, 7-point) differ between our two studies. This has implications for the interpretability of scores: Druckman and Levendusky (2019) show that party ratings may be more negative than party supporter ratings and mostly capture feelings about party elites. However, both ratings are widely used in the literature to calculate affective polarization and we have no reason to assume systematic differences beyond different baseline levels.

To test the government-opposition hypothesis (H1), we descriptively compare the distribution of feeling thermometer scores for each party among opposition supporters, excluding the party for which a respondent voted. We had originally also pre-registered a t-test but eventually had to discard this approach as our second study has a more complex actor constellation. This is the only deviation from our pre-analysis plan.

To test the democracy hypotheses (H2a and H2b), we estimate regression models predicting the support for each party. Here, we implement the following models for each of the dependent variables:

$$evaluation_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 libdem + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 age + \beta_4 economy + \beta_5 lr + \beta_6 govoppo + \beta_7 polinterest + \epsilon_i$$

where

- *libdem* is a factor measuring democratic attitudes from a battery of questions. For Study 1, this is a factor constructed from four questions from the European Social Survey which we preregistered (See Table A1 in the Appendix). For Study 2, we include a larger adapted battery of World Value Survey questions to measure liberal, authoritarian and majoritarian attitudes. We estimate a two-factor solution (given the broader set of items) and select the factor that represents liberal items (See Table A2).
- *govoppo* is respondents' vote intention in the next election, simplified into government, opposition and non-voters; for Study 2 additionally separating Confederation
- a range of control variables is included: respondents' gender, age, economic situation, left-right position and political interest. Detailed descriptions are included in Table A3 in the

²Measures of AP in multi-party contexts typically include weighting for party size (Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2021) which is difficult in our cases where some parties have not run in prior elections. Some measures (Reiljan, 2020) only include partisans but not undecided voters, whereas spread-based measures (Wagner, 2021) may be sensitive to the size of party coalitions, which are central to our case studies. Thus, in our application, raw evaluations are the most straightforward measure to use.

Appendix.

To test the partisan hypothesis (H3), we add an interaction term between the liberal democracy item and the *govoppo* variable.

Robustness Checks We preregistered several alternative specifications: Given left and right are used differently in Central-Eastern Europe, we test a measure differentiating economic and cultural left-right positions. Similarly, we also include a more complex party variable, including vote intention in the next election instead of the simplified government-opposition measure. Finally, we replicate the main models excluding respondents who stated that they voted for the party that is used as a dependent variable. This provides a more conservative estimate of the evaluation of in- and out-group evaluations for a coalition beyond the party which respondents favor.

Results

Before delving into the specific survey results on partisan affect and democratic attitudes in our two studies, we explore attitudes towards democracy over time in both countries. Our argument holds that democratic backsliding may lead to a deepening of affective polarization around democratic attitudes. By examining the evolution of democratic attitudes over a longer period, we seek to contextualize the snapshot insight provided by our survey data collected at a single time point.




Figure 3: Time Series of "How Democratic is your Country?" question in Hungary and Poland, drawing from the WVS, EVS and ISSP surveys. Rescaled to 10-point scale where original scale was 11-points.

To this effect, Figure 3 shows the over-time development of responses to the question how democratic citizens think their country is. At first sight, change is limited in both countries with




Figure 4: Standard deviation of rescaled responses.

a largely stable average hovering around the middle of the scale. This aggregate perspective, however, hides an underlying polarization of attitudes towards democracy in these countries: Figure 4 shows the standard deviation of these responses, which speaks to the widening gap in citizens’ assessments: in both Hungary and Poland, the standard deviation increases from a rather low level in the early 2000s to a much higher level at the latest available data point in 2016 and 2017, respectively. These patterns indicate an increasing divergence in citizens’ evaluations of their country’s democratic performance and is in line with our assumption that democratic backsliding eventually contributes to a growing divide between citizens that is organised around views of democracy. Against this backdrop, we further explore the shape and depth of this divide drawing on original survey data collected in Poland and Hungary. We begin by providing a brief overview of the electoral and party system in place in each of our study countries to discuss how these contextual factors may affect the shape of party competition and partisan affect, and then move on to evaluating the three stages of our theoretical argument in light of our empirical data.

Study 1: Hungary

The Hungarian electoral system – which allocates the majority of seats in single-member districts – has strong majoritarian tendencies that the Fidesz government further increased via an electoral reform in 2012 (Tóka, 2014). In light of these structural incentives for parties to cooperate, opposition parties in Hungary have engaged in a considerable extent of coalition-building, eventually rallying at the latest parliamentary elections in April 2022 behind a single joint candidate. While electoral coalitions had existed in previous elections, the 2022 coalition was broader than any before and included a closer cooperation. In principle, we may expect the existence of such a formal coalition to favor a government-opposition divide in affective terms,

Table 1: Hungary Democracy Scores (CHES – 2019).

Party	Score
Democratic Coalition	3.0
Dialogue for Hungary	-
Fidesz – KDNP	9.5
Hungarian Socialist Party	4.4
Hungary’s Green Party	3.2
Jobbik	8.6
Momentum	2.0

Note: average expert rating of party preference for civil liberties (0) versus law and order (10) (CIVLIB_LAWORDER).

mirroring Bantel’s (2023) demonstration that a cross-camp coalition government may weaken affective polarization.

Still, Hungary represents a hard case for such a regime divide to emerge: with the far-right Jobbik, one of the governing Fidesz party’s main competitors is ideologically distant from the other opposition parties (see e.g. Róna, 2016). Although the party has gone through a process of moderation in the past years (Borbáth and Gessler, 2023), these ideological differences are not easy to bridge. In fact, appeasing Jobbik voters has been key to Fidesz’ policy agenda (Böcskei and Molnár, 2019). Table 1 shows the democracy scores for the different Hungarian parties, indicating a clear split between Fidesz and Jobbik on the one hand, and leftist parties on the other.

Given the party’s radical right orientation, Jobbik evaluations by voters thus may be subject to unique dynamics (Harteveld, Mendoza, and Rooduijn, 2021). Specifically, its critical stance towards democracy and liberal institutions (Kyriazi, 2016; Pirro, 2016) may override potential in-group feelings for citizens who value liberal democracy. Hence, in line with our pre-registration, when interpreting the results we evaluate our hypothesis both including and excluding Jobbik.

Besides, the recent political history of Hungary has also led to significant divides within the left opposition (Gessler and Kyriazi, 2019). Most notably, there are differences between left-wing parties whose representatives have previously held government office (MSZP, DK) and those who where never in power. Consequently, despite the hypothesized in-group effect, we expect to find considerable divisions among the opposition parties.


A new regime divide (Hungary) We begin by examining the evaluation of support for specific parties by government and opposition supporters. Here, we expect to see an affective divide separating government from opposition supporters. As shown in Figure 5, this is indeed the

case: government and opposition supporters in Hungary differ starkly in their evaluations, clearly highlighting the entrenchment of the government and opposition camps in Hungary: government supporters in the upper panel rate all opposition parties decidedly more negatively than the population mean (dashed line) does. Judging the supporters of each opposition party, between just above a quarter (Green Party) and 42 per cent (Democratic Coalition) of all prospective Fidesz voters select the most extreme dislike score for opposition supporters. This is mirrored by opposition supporters' dislike of Fidesz: here, the gap between the opposition supporters' mean evaluation of Fidesz and the population average (including opposition supporters) amounts to almost 3 points on an 11-point scale. More than half of the opposition supporters select the most extreme dislike category for Fidesz, while this share is around or below 6 per cent for any of the opposition parties.

Given that the literature suggests voters tend to voice more moderate opinions when asked about the *supporters* of other parties (Druckman and Levendusky, 2019), this amount of dislike is momentous. It provides clear support for our *government-opposition hypothesis*: opposition voters evaluate Fidesz significantly more negatively but all opposition parties significantly more positively. The opposite is true for Fidesz voters, who evaluate their own group very positively but supporters of all opposition parties negatively.

While these results are descriptive, they also receive support from regression models predicting the evaluation of supporters of different parties by vote intention, compared to a baseline of undecided and non-voters. We include these results in the Appendix (Table A5). These regression results also hold when we consider alternative left-right measures (Table A11), a complex party measure (Table A15) and when we exclude evaluations of the party each respondent intends to vote for (Table A19). Although there is heterogeneity between the supporters of different opposition parties, the clear government-opposition divide remains visible in all these specifications.

Evaluations by Government supporters



Evaluations by Opposition supporters



Figure 5: Evaluations of parties by vote intention (excluding intended vote)

Democracy and the regime divide (Hungary) Having established the size of the regime divide, we now turn to its content. According to our theoretical argument, voters' relative commitment to liberal democracy should shape their attitudes towards different groups of party supporters. Specifically, we expect respondents with a more liberal understanding of democracy to feel more negatively towards ruling party supporters and more positively towards supporters of opposition parties. Table 2 presents regression models that predict the evaluation of the supporters of different parties. The independent variables are support for Fidesz and the opposition compared to a baseline of undecided voters. To assess whether the divide we study is substantively about democracy, we draw on democracy support, measured as discussed in the Research Design section. Given the difficulty of accurately capturing support for democracy via traditional survey items, our measure of liberal democratic commitment is heavily skewed with supporters of all parties mostly considering all items as important (Figure A2). This is also visible from the distribution of the raw variable (see Figure A1).

By including democracy support into the models, we seek to estimate how liberal democratic commitment affects the evaluation of different party supporter groups (*democracy hypotheses*). Again, the models mostly confirm our expectations: democratic attitudes have a sizeable and significant negative effect on evaluations of Fidesz voters, whereas they have a positive effect on the evaluation of supporters of most opposition parties. Evaluations of Jobbik and MSZP supporters are notable exceptions: the effect of democratic attitudes on the evaluation of Jobbik supporters is not significant and slightly negative, compared to a slightly positive but insignificant effect on MSZP supporters. Moreover, the effect on supporters of the Democratic Coalition (DK) is only significant at the $p < 0.05$ level and loses significance in some of our alternative specifications in the supplementary material (see Tables A13, A17, A21). These caveats are, however, in line with our pre-registered expectations: given its right-wing ideology, we suggested Jobbik may be excluded from the 'democratic divide.' Similarly, we assumed that the former governing parties MSZP and DK may be more divisive.

Partisanship and democratic views (Hungary) In a third step, we evaluate to what extent vote intention moderates the effect of democratic attitudes upon partisan affect. We expected the effects of liberal democratic attitudes to be restricted to in-camp evaluations by opposition supporters and did not expect the same effect of democratic attitudes for Fidesz voters, since the incumbency of their preferred party is likely to weaken any concerns around

Table 2: Regression results democracy model Hungary (baseline: undecided voters)

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	1.87 *** (0.31)	4.41 *** (0.35)	5.47 *** (0.32)	5.71 *** (0.33)	5.46 *** (0.30)	5.63 *** (0.32)	5.35 *** (0.31)
Fidesz	4.54 *** (0.13)	-1.22 *** (0.15)	-0.81 *** (0.13)	-1.22 *** (0.14)	-1.18 *** (0.13)	-1.28 *** (0.13)	-1.03 *** (0.13)
opposition	-1.65 *** (0.12)	2.69 *** (0.14)	1.24 *** (0.13)	1.82 *** (0.13)	1.28 *** (0.12)	1.46 *** (0.13)	1.24 *** (0.12)
left-right	0.24 *** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.30 *** (0.03)	-0.36 *** (0.03)	-0.26 *** (0.03)	-0.26 *** (0.03)	-0.24 *** (0.03)
Democracy	-0.27 *** (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.16 * (0.06)	0.23 *** (0.06)	0.34 *** (0.06)	0.23 *** (0.06)
R2 (N=2034)	0.63	0.30	0.22	0.33	0.27	0.29	0.24

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Controls included for gender, age (categorical), political interest, economic status and left-right position.

democratic violations. To probe this third stage of our argument, we interacted the liberal democracy scale with the indicator for government/opposition support. As the raw coefficients of interaction models with factor variables are difficult to interpret, we report the full model in the supplementary material (Table A9) and plot the interaction effects for each party in Figure 6. Here, the y-axis plots the feeling thermometer scores for each party with the x-axis showing the variation in democratic attitudes. The two lines represents the different partisan group included in our previous models (prospective opposition voters and Fidesz voters).

We focus first on how prospective opposition voters evaluate the supporters of different parties, dependent on their level of support for liberal democracy. We find a negative effect of liberal democracy on evaluations of Fidesz supporters that contrasts with a positive effect of liberal democracy on the evaluations of most opposition party supporters among prospective opposition voters. This effect is sizeable and significant for DK, Dialogue, Momentum and LMP. In contrast, the effect is very weak and – in the case of Jobbik – slightly negative for evaluations of Jobbik and MSZP voters. This pattern is again broadly confirmed by our robustness checks included in the supplementary material and is in line with our assumptions, since we expected




Figure 6: Interaction effect of party choice and democracy attitudes in Hungary

the in-party bonus of democracy-affirming opposition voters not necessarily to extend to the right-wing Jobbik party.

For Fidesz voters, we do not find a positive effect of support for democracy on evaluations of opposition party supporters. Specifically, we find a very small positive effect on evaluations of Fidesz supporters and small negative effects on the evaluation of most opposition parties with the exception of LMP. Given the very small effect sizes, this leads us to conclude that how Fidesz voters evaluate the supporters of (other) parties seems to be largely unaffected by their support for liberal democracy.

Overall, our findings in Hungary are in line with our expectations regarding the emergence of a ‘democracy divide’ between government and opposition supporters against the backdrop of deepening democratic backsliding. We find a clear affective divide between Fidesz supporters and those supporting the opposition, a significant effect for democratic attitudes shaping respondents’ attitudes towards different parties, and an interaction between such attitudes and vote intention in the expected direction. These findings map neatly onto the emergence of a joint electoral coalition in Hungary in the run-up to the last parliamentary elections in April 2022, suggesting that a common desire to defend democratic values was one of the key drivers of this joint mobilization.

Study 2: Poland

To probe whether our finding of a democracy-based affective divide between government and opposition supporters generalizes beyond the Hungarian case and the unique opposition coalition in the country, we repeat our analysis with data from Poland. Here, the onset of democratic backsliding is more recent and elections remain more competitive. The situation of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party is therefore more precarious than that of Fidesz, with electoral success still a real possibility for the opposition (Bakke and Sitter, 2022). Regarding institutional factors, the Polish electoral system is a proportional system that does not require parties to formally coalesce, which might have an additional effect on affective polarization (Praprotnik and Wagner, N.d.).

In contrast to the ideological heterogeneity and structural weakness of the Hungarian opposition, the Polish opposition is overall stronger and more coherent (Solska, 2020). Already during the 2018 local elections, the Civic Platform (PO) and Modern came together as the Civic Coalition (KO) to enhance their chances. During the 2019 parliamentary elections, informal

Table 3: Poland Democracy Scores (CHES – 2019).

Party	Score
Civic Coalition	2.9
Confederation	8.6
The Left	1.4
Law and Justice	9.1
Poland 2050	-

Note: average expert rating of party preference for civil liberties (0) versus law and order (10) (CIVLIB_LAWORDER).

coalitions and the fielding of common candidates in the first-past-the-post Senate districts allowed the opposition to improve its standing (Ilonszki and Dudzińska, 2021). Besides, the more recently created Poland 2050 appeals to the same broadly liberal conservative electorate as KO, making these two largest opposition parties ideologically very compatible. Table 3 shows the democracy scores for the main Polish party coalitions included in our survey (with coalition ratings based on the aggregation of their members’ individual scores). The newly-founded far-right party Confederation forms an exception among the Polish opposition parties, leading us to treat it separately in our analysis in line with our pre-registration.


While deepening societal polarization (Markowski, 2020) and the high salience of party positions on liberal democracy make Poland a likely case to find the expected democracy-related regime divide, the long-standing bipolar confrontation between PiS and PO and the lack of electoral system incentives to collaborate may work against finding a similarly clear ‘democracy divide’ encompassing all opposition parties as in Hungary.

A new regime divide (Poland) In the first step, we again descriptively assess the camp structure present in the opposition to examine the presence of a government-opposition divide. Notably, we find a less clear divide here: government supporters are primarily more critical of their main competitor – KO – which is disliked by almost half the PiS supporters, while their evaluations of the other opposition parties are rather moderate. Notable is also their fairly positive evaluation of Confederation, a far-right party alliance that includes monarchist parties.

On the other side, even though we exclude Confederation from the opposition block, we see strong agreement among opposition supporters only in the condemnation of the PiS party and – to a lesser extent – Confederation. Of course, the specific values cannot be compared directly to the Hungarian case, given that the scale and the object (party supporters versus parties) differ.

Again, these descriptive results receive support from the baseline regression model we include

Evaluations by Government supporters



Evaluations by Opposition supporters




Figure 7: Evaluations of parties by vote intention (excluding intended vote)

in Table A24 in the Supplementary Material. Overall, while we do not observe the government-opposition divide to the same extent as in Hungary, the observed differences are broadly in line with our expectations.

Democracy and the regime divide (Poland) We turn to addressing how liberal democracy influences the size of the regime divide, by estimating a regression model that includes attitudes towards liberal democracy. Interestingly, Table 4 reveals that support for liberal democracy across the entire sample has a negative effect on the evaluation of PiS, KO and Confederation. In other words, across the pooled sample, the former governing coalition under PO (that eventually enlarged to the Civic Coalition), is also seen more critically by more democracy-supporting individuals, to a similar extent as the incumbent PiS and the far-right Confederation party.

Table 4: Regression results democracy model Poland (baseline: undecided voters)

	PiS	PO	P2050	Left	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.43 *** (0.15)	3.86 *** (0.16)	3.54 *** (0.15)	4.96 *** (0.15)	2.27 *** (0.16)
PiS	2.62 *** (0.07)	-0.93 *** (0.08)	-0.54 *** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)
opposition	-0.95 *** (0.06)	1.24 *** (0.07)	1.00 *** (0.06)	0.48 *** (0.06)	-0.51 *** (0.07)
confederation	-0.41 *** (0.10)	-0.73 *** (0.11)	-0.73 *** (0.10)	-0.62 *** (0.10)	1.86 *** (0.10)
left-right	0.24 *** (0.02)	-0.22 *** (0.02)	-0.07 ** (0.02)	-0.48 *** (0.02)	0.20 *** (0.02)
Democracy	-0.07 ** (0.03)	-0.07 * (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.15 *** (0.03)
R2 (N=2910)	0.65	0.40	0.27	0.32	0.27

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Controls included for gender, age (categorical), political interest, economic status and left-right position.

Partisanship and democratic views (Poland) The mixed findings regarding the impact of liberal democracy on the regime divide may partially result from partisan bias, which we assess in




Figure 8: Interaction effect of party choice and democracy attitudes in Poland

the final step of our analysis Figure 6 highlights heterogeneity in the effect of democracy support across the different groups that is mostly in line with our results from Hungary: for opposition supporters (including supporters of KO, Poland 2050 as well as the Left), democracy support decreases evaluations of PiS and increases evaluations of all parties within the opposition block. However, the effects are substantively small and do not reach statistical significance in some of the cases (see Table A27), as the less steep slopes also indicate. For government supporters, in turn, higher support for liberal democracy leads to more negative evaluations of KO and, to a lesser extent, Poland 2050. In sum, most of the time, support for democracy does not seem to make a difference in Poland and, where it does, its impact is primarily negative.

Overall, our findings indicate that the government-opposition divide crystallises around the ruling PiS party and its traditional opponent KO, rather than extending more broadly to all opposition parties. This may in part be explained by the novelty of Polska 2050, the second large opposition party besides the Civic Coalition. Founded only in 2020, this party may still be difficult to situate for many respondents, with antagonism instead focusing around the two traditional rivals PiS and KO. Ultimately, the empirical analysis points to a less entrenched opposition coalition in Poland than was the case in Hungary. Instead, in the Polish context, democracy support seems to burn rather than build bridges and increase dislike rather than enable coalitions.

Discussion

Our paper set out to assess whether, besides being a contributing factor to democratic backsliding, affective polarization may also be a consequence of a protracted episode of backsliding. Specifically, we expected to find growing partisan affect related to citizens' divergent evaluations of democracy in contexts of backsliding, whereby government and opposition supporters would become increasingly divided – and the opposition internally united – over their distinct appreciation of democratic quality. Positing three complementary dimensions of such an emerging 'regime divide,' we predicted the strength of liberal democratic commitment to drive growing partisan affect between supporters of the government and the opposition 'camp.' Besides, we expected the effect of democratic attitudes to be conditional upon partisan camp membership, with the democracy effect primarily present for opposition supporters.

We conducted two separate studies of countries from the post-communist region, where initial democratisation was already characterized by a 'regime divide' related to the communist

past of certain parties, whereby association with or opposition to the former communist system shapes party coalitions as well as electoral punishment (Grzymala-Busse, 2001). Similar to this post-communist ‘regime divide,’ we argued that democratic backsliding may shape a new regime divide that polarizes evaluations of parties and their supporters around attitudes towards democracy and democratic backsliding.

Our findings lend partial support to the theorized relationship between democratic backsliding and affective polarization. In both studies, we find a strong affective dislike of the ruling party among opposition supporters. However, partisan affect in Hungary also extends to the emergence of a more united group of opposition parties. This may be due to the majoritarian nature of the Hungarian electoral system having forced opposition parties to band together, leading their supporters to view each other as allies against an undemocratic government. This tendency has shifted the Hungarian multi-party system towards an increasingly bipolar structure, with opposition supporters uniting around their opposition to the government and its democratic violations across ideological divides.

This effect is not visible to the same extent in Poland. Here, democratic attitudes only seem to shape the condemnation of anti-democratic actors, without forging a coherent in-group among supporters of opposition parties. Instead, our findings indicate a more classical divide between the two main parties that have alternated in power over the past years. Opposition supporters seem to be united in their dislike of the government, but less clearly united across opposition party lines. Two factors may explain this pattern: for one, Poland finds itself at a comparatively earlier stage in the backsliding process, when group identities are less strongly structured by democratic attitudes and distinct partisan preferences persist among opposition supporters. Moreover, cooperation among the opposition for now is less intense than in the Hungarian case. We can only speculate whether a united pro-democratic front running in the Polish elections in the future might bridge these gaps.

Overall, our empirical analysis thus suggests that support for liberal democracy may indeed reinforce affective polarization: citizens – or more specifically opposition supporters – who value democracy tend to evaluate their in-group more favorably but out-groups more negatively. As expected, we find some partial exceptions to this pattern, particularly concerning the populist right-wing Jobbik party in Hungary and the Confederation party in Poland, which are less integrated into the opposition block. While our data can only offer a snapshot insight into the state of democracy-related partisan affect, the polarization of democratic evaluations over time

indicates that the process of backsliding itself contributes to a deepening partisan affect related to opposing views of the quality of democracy.

The fact that the expected affective divide between government and opposition supporters is clearer in Hungary, where backsliding is more long-standing and entrenched than in Poland, thus increasing the salience of democracy in the eyes of the voters, further lends credence to this interpretation. Previous research on the emergence of new cleavages suggests that these undergo different stages, shifting from being 'embryonic' and of concern to only a limited number of voters, to becoming a more general theme of mobilization right up to reaching maturity, when a new cleavage mobilizing a relevant portion of the electorate and remains stable across elections (Emanuele, Marino, and Angelucci, 2020). Arguably, whereas the democratic divide is a clear mobilizing issue in Poland, it is reached full maturity in the Hungarian context with Fidesz in its fourth consecutive mandate.

Conclusion

Our paper theorizes and empirically explores a positive linkage between democratic backsliding and deepening partisan affect that restructures the political landscape along a 'regime divide' over democracy itself. Our research speaks to several ongoing debates around the nature and drivers of affective polarization and its relationship to democratic backsliding.

We complement existing accounts of the negative effect of affective polarization upon democratic backsliding with a more positive reading that views democratic backsliding as driving an affective divide around democracy that helps unite an ideologically diverse opposition camp in defence of democracy. By highlighting the unifying effect of joint concern for democracy for the opposition in backsliding regimes, we thus propose a different lens through which researchers can analyze the macro-level relationship between both processes. We hasten to reaffirm that we do not contest potential effects of affective polarization on tolerance for democratic backsliding. Instead, we argue that we may *also* interpret affective polarization as a consequence of a government's undemocratic behavior. Specifically, we posit a mutually reinforcing relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding, whereby affect-based tolerance of democratic violations by government supporters leads to a polarization of party evaluations around views of liberal democracy, eventually producing a regime divide that unites an otherwise disparate group of opposition parties in their rejection of the incumbent and their supporters due to concerns over democracy. In this sense, our findings confirm the relevance of 'camp-based' affective

polarization (Bantel, 2023; Hartevelde, 2021) that shifts in response to political outcomes and can unite broader groups of party supporters in opposition to a common out-group.

The presence of a two-way dynamic between democratic backsliding and affective polarization may alter our evaluation of the role affectively polarized electorates play in contexts of democratic backsliding. By offering a positive view of partisan affect as a consequence of democratic backsliding, we challenge the perspective that polarization generally has a pernicious effect upon democratic quality (Somer, McCoy, and Luke, 2021, 16). Instead, we contend that when affective polarization is a response to the degradation of democracy, it may actually favor the exclusion of anti-democratic actors and increase voters' and party elites' willingness to bridge ideological differences in defense of democracy. Opposition coalitions – which may successfully compete with incumbents engaged in democratic backsliding – may thus become more likely to emerge when citizens are united by a 'democratic divide.'

Our empirical discussion focused on two case studies from the post-communist region, where the existence of a 'regime divide' related to parties' status during the democratic transition has previously been demonstrated (Grzymala-Busse, 2001). The common historical legacy of our two studies may be thought to limit the generalisability of our argument. However, we do not consider our argument to be limited to the specific post-communist context. Instead, we contend that multi-party settings with high levels of fragmentation and ideological heterogeneity among opposition parties more generally represent a significant hurdle for a joint mobilisation of opposition parties around the defence of democracy. The fact that we find clear signs of this dynamic in Hungary and, more tentatively, Poland, makes us confident that our findings hold wider significance for our understanding of the societal dynamics resulting from democratic backsliding. Most notably, societal polarization represents a trend that extends well beyond the specific post-communist region (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018; Somer, McCoy, and Luke, 2021; Carothers and O'Donohue, 2019). In light of the spread of democratic backsliding across different world regions, it seems plausible to expect similar dynamics of affective polarization around democratic attitudes to emerge in different geographic contexts. We are therefore confident that our argument regarding the two-way relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding holds insights that are relevant well beyond our cases. The ongoing debates around the attack on the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 are a case in point: partisan polarization in the United States increasingly mirrors a divide over democratic attitudes.

An important limitation of our analysis concerns its cross-sectional nature that is able to

address temporal dynamics only in a contextualising fashion. This is true also for most existing studies that focus on the impact of affective polarization upon democratic backsliding (Orhan, 2022; Somer and McCoy, 2018). In the future, researchers should further probe the relationship between democratic backsliding and affective polarization by adopting experimental or panel approaches that allow them to tease out the causal relationship between these two processes. Such evidence would be key to a comprehensive and dynamic understanding of affective polarization in contexts of democratic backsliding. Our study provides a first indication of the mechanisms that may underpin such processes.

Finally, our findings highlight the importance of studying the effect of political elites and media on affective polarization: while we have not investigated *why* attitudes towards democracy matter for affective polarization, the strength and character of the long-standing political conflict around the issue of democracy in Hungary (Gessler and Kyriazi, 2019) as well as in Poland is a potential explanation. That is, when parties mobilize voters' democratic attitudes in election campaigns, these attitudes can shape how voters evaluate –and eventually choose among– parties.

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Supplementary information

A new regime divide? Partisan affect and attitudes towards democratic backsliding

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Variables

Table A1: Factor loadings for items on a single liberal democracy factor

Question	Loading
National elections are free and fair	0.85
The courts treat everyone the same	0.79
The courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority	0.73
The rights of minorities are protected	0.49

Table A2: Factor loadings for items on two democracy factors

Dim	Question	Factor1	Factor2
Lib.	People choose their leaders in free elections.	0.66	0.16
Lib.	Civil rights protect people from state oppression.	0.62	0.06
Lib.	Women have the same rights as men.	0.55	0.11
Auth.	The government uses violence to enforce public order.	-0.60	0.33
Auth.	Elections only serve to confirm the ruling party in office.	-0.48	0.37
Auth.	The government limits civic freedoms to rule efficiently.	-0.63	0.36
Maj.	The majority can always overrule the minority.	0.03	0.63
Maj.	Any law can be changed if there is a majority for it.	0.05	0.58
Maj.	The minority must accept the will of the majority in all circumstances.	-0.07	0.56

Table A3: Definition of variables

Variable	Measure
<i>libdem</i>	Battery of democratic attitudes, see Table A1 & A2
<i>age</i>	categorical variable [18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55+]
<i>economy</i>	Study 1: respondents' subjective economic situation [I struggle to cover my basic needs, I can cover my basic needs, but nothing more, I can cover my basic needs and have some money left over, My financial situation is good, My financial situation is very good.] Study 2: respondents' satisfaction with their personal economic situation [strongly dissatisfied (1) to strongly satisfied (7)]
<i>lr</i>	Study 1: 11-point scale of left-right positions; Study 2, 7-point scale of left-right positions
<i>govoppo</i>	respondents' vote intention in the next election, simplified into government, opposition and non-voters, Study 2 separates Confederation voters.
<i>polinterest</i>	respondents' political interest

Descriptives Democracy




Figure A1: Distribution of democracy conception items, ESS (HU)




Figure A2: Factor distribution of democracy conceptions by party, ESS (HU)




Figure A3: Distribution of democracy conception items, WVS adapted (PL)




Figure A4: Factor distribution of democracy conceptions by party, WVS adapted (PL)

Regression Models (Study 1)

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.12*** (0.30)	4.42*** (0.34)	5.42*** (0.31)	5.57*** (0.33)	5.25*** (0.30)	5.31*** (0.32)	5.14*** (0.31)
gender2	0.30** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.21* (0.10)	0.30** (0.11)	0.21* (0.10)	0.11 (0.11)	0.07 (0.10)
gov_oppFidesz	4.56***	-1.22***	-0.82***	-1.23***	-1.19***	-1.29***	-1.04***

	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.68***	2.69***	1.24***	1.83***	1.30***	1.48***	1.25***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
age_group2	-0.24	-0.04	0.10	0.48*	0.14	0.09	0.20
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group3	-0.34	-0.22	0.27	0.44*	0.10	0.07	0.23
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
age_group4	0.05	-0.29	0.17	0.57**	0.15	-0.16	0.17
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group5	-0.15	-0.44*	0.46*	0.80***	0.31	-0.03	0.25
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
economy2	0.32*	0.15	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.58***	0.45**
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
economy3	0.37*	-0.24	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.65***	0.38*
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
economy4	0.34	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.65**	0.96***	0.67**
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)
economy5	0.67	0.76	-0.25	-0.86	0.22	0.92	0.46
	(0.61)	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.66)	(0.60)	(0.64)	(0.62)
polinterest2	0.53**	0.88***	0.50*	0.53*	0.86***	0.70***	0.71***
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
polinterest3	0.49**	0.70***	0.41*	0.57**	0.92***	0.87***	0.82***
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
polinterest4	0.36	0.62**	0.52**	0.70***	1.16***	1.06***	0.97***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
polinterest5	0.44	0.35	0.40	0.74**	1.11***	1.05***	0.68**
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)
lrscale	0.24***	0.03	-0.30***	-0.36***	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R ²	0.62	0.30	0.22	0.33	0.27	0.28	0.23
Adj. R ²	0.62	0.29	0.21	0.32	0.26	0.27	0.22
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A5: Statistical Models H1

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	1.87***	4.41***	5.47***	5.71***	5.46***	5.63***	5.35***

	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.31)
gender2	0.34***	-0.01	0.20	0.28*	0.18	0.07	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
gov_oppFidesz	4.54***	-1.22***	-0.81***	-1.22***	-1.18***	-1.28***	-1.03***
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.65***	2.69***	1.24***	1.82***	1.28***	1.46***	1.24***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
age_group2	-0.14	-0.03	0.08	0.42	0.05	-0.04	0.12
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group3	-0.21	-0.22	0.24	0.36	-0.02	-0.10	0.11
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
age_group4	0.24	-0.28	0.14	0.46*	-0.01	-0.40	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group5	0.05	-0.43*	0.42*	0.69***	0.14	-0.27	0.09
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
economy2	0.35*	0.15	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.54***	0.42**
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
economy3	0.40**	-0.24	0.20	0.05	0.10	0.61***	0.35*
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
economy4	0.35	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.64**	0.95***	0.66**
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)
economy5	0.55	0.75	-0.22	-0.80	0.32	1.06	0.55
	(0.61)	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.66)	(0.60)	(0.63)	(0.61)
polinterest2	0.54**	0.89***	0.49*	0.52*	0.85***	0.68***	0.69***
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
polinterest3	0.58**	0.70***	0.40*	0.52**	0.85***	0.76***	0.74***
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
polinterest4	0.49*	0.62**	0.49*	0.62**	1.05***	0.90***	0.86***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
polinterest5	0.57*	0.35	0.37	0.67**	1.00***	0.89***	0.56*
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)
lrscale	0.24***	0.03	-0.30***	-0.36***	-0.26***	-0.26***	-0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ess	-0.27***	-0.01	0.05	0.16*	0.23***	0.34***	0.23***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
R ²	0.63	0.30	0.22	0.33	0.27	0.29	0.24
Adj. R ²	0.63	0.29	0.21	0.32	0.27	0.28	0.23
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A7: Statistical Models H2

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	1.93*** (0.30)	4.39*** (0.35)	5.45*** (0.32)	5.66*** (0.33)	5.41*** (0.30)	5.56*** (0.32)	5.32*** (0.31)
gender2	0.31** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.21* (0.10)	0.30** (0.11)	0.21* (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)	0.05 (0.10)
gov_oppFidesz	4.56*** (0.13)	-1.24*** (0.15)	-0.82*** (0.13)	-1.23*** (0.14)	-1.19*** (0.13)	-1.28*** (0.13)	-1.03*** (0.13)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.63*** (0.12)	2.69*** (0.14)	1.23*** (0.13)	1.80*** (0.13)	1.26*** (0.12)	1.43*** (0.13)	1.22*** (0.12)
ess	-0.32*** (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.23** (0.08)	0.27** (0.08)	0.20* (0.08)
age_group2	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.23)	0.08 (0.21)	0.40 (0.21)	0.03 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.11 (0.20)
age_group3	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.22)	0.23 (0.20)	0.32 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.20)	0.09 (0.20)
age_group4	0.26 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.23)	0.13 (0.21)	0.43* (0.22)	-0.03 (0.20)	-0.44* (0.21)	-0.01 (0.20)
age_group5	0.07 (0.19)	-0.41 (0.21)	0.41* (0.19)	0.64** (0.20)	0.11 (0.19)	-0.34 (0.19)	0.06 (0.19)
economy2	0.31* (0.15)	0.18 (0.17)	0.26 (0.15)	0.27 (0.16)	0.29* (0.15)	0.56*** (0.15)	0.43** (0.15)
economy3	0.34* (0.15)	-0.21 (0.18)	0.22 (0.16)	0.09 (0.17)	0.14 (0.15)	0.65*** (0.16)	0.38* (0.16)
economy4	0.33 (0.22)	0.13 (0.25)	0.13 (0.23)	0.08 (0.24)	0.65** (0.22)	0.96*** (0.23)	0.67** (0.22)
economy5	0.45 (0.61)	0.84 (0.69)	-0.20 (0.63)	-0.76 (0.66)	0.39 (0.60)	1.11 (0.63)	0.58 (0.61)
polinterest2	0.55** (0.20)	0.85*** (0.23)	0.49* (0.20)	0.53* (0.21)	0.84*** (0.20)	0.69*** (0.21)	0.70*** (0.20)
polinterest3	0.58** (0.18)	0.66** (0.21)	0.40* (0.19)	0.54** (0.20)	0.85*** (0.18)	0.79*** (0.19)	0.76*** (0.19)
polinterest4	0.50* (0.19)	0.59** (0.22)	0.49* (0.20)	0.65** (0.21)	1.06*** (0.19)	0.93*** (0.20)	0.87*** (0.20)
polinterest5	0.61** (0.23)	0.33 (0.26)	0.37 (0.23)	0.65** (0.25)	0.97*** (0.22)	0.86*** (0.24)	0.55* (0.23)

lrscale	0.23*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.30*** (0.03)	-0.35*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.26*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)
gov_oppFidesz:ess	0.47*** (0.13)	-0.34* (0.15)	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.24 (0.15)	-0.34** (0.13)	-0.29* (0.14)	-0.15 (0.14)
gov_oppOpposition:ess	-0.23 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.14)	0.09 (0.13)	0.38** (0.14)	0.27* (0.12)	0.49*** (0.13)	0.21 (0.13)
R ²	0.63	0.30	0.22	0.34	0.28	0.30	0.24
Adj. R ²	0.63	0.29	0.21	0.33	0.27	0.29	0.23
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A9: Statistical Models H3

Models two-dimensional left-right (Study 1)

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.41*** (0.28)	4.94*** (0.32)	4.89*** (0.29)	5.16*** (0.30)	5.43*** (0.27)	5.63*** (0.28)	5.12*** (0.28)
gender2	0.31** (0.10)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.22* (0.10)	0.30** (0.11)	0.20* (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)
gov_oppFidesz	4.59*** (0.13)	-1.11*** (0.14)	-0.88*** (0.13)	-1.25*** (0.14)	-1.07*** (0.12)	-1.13*** (0.13)	-0.98*** (0.13)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.61*** (0.12)	2.61*** (0.14)	1.19*** (0.13)	1.73*** (0.13)	1.16*** (0.12)	1.31*** (0.13)	1.15*** (0.12)
age_group2	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.23)	0.16 (0.20)	0.55** (0.21)	0.20 (0.19)	0.16 (0.20)	0.26 (0.20)
age_group3	-0.41* (0.19)	-0.25 (0.22)	0.38 (0.20)	0.59** (0.21)	0.25 (0.19)	0.25 (0.19)	0.35 (0.19)
age_group4	-0.02 (0.20)	-0.32 (0.22)	0.29 (0.20)	0.71*** (0.21)	0.29 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.20)	0.28 (0.20)
age_group5	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.47* (0.21)	0.64*** (0.19)	1.02*** (0.20)	0.51** (0.18)	0.20 (0.19)	0.42* (0.18)
economy2	0.29* (0.15)	0.16 (0.17)	0.28 (0.15)	0.30 (0.16)	0.32* (0.14)	0.60*** (0.15)	0.47** (0.15)
economy3	0.34* (0.16)	-0.16 (0.18)	0.20 (0.16)	0.07 (0.17)	0.12 (0.15)	0.64*** (0.16)	0.39* (0.16)
economy4	0.33 (0.22)	0.22 (0.25)	0.06 (0.23)	0.02 (0.24)	0.60** (0.21)	0.90*** (0.22)	0.64** (0.22)

economy5	0.86 (0.61)	0.82 (0.69)	-0.54 (0.63)	-1.23 (0.65)	-0.09 (0.59)	0.56 (0.61)	0.19 (0.61)
polinterest2	0.59** (0.20)	0.90*** (0.22)	0.41* (0.20)	0.42* (0.21)	0.78*** (0.19)	0.61** (0.20)	0.63** (0.20)
polinterest3	0.60** (0.18)	0.69*** (0.21)	0.28 (0.19)	0.40* (0.20)	0.78*** (0.18)	0.72*** (0.18)	0.69*** (0.18)
polinterest4	0.58** (0.19)	0.62** (0.22)	0.25 (0.20)	0.36 (0.20)	0.88*** (0.18)	0.77*** (0.19)	0.72*** (0.19)
polinterest5	0.75*** (0.23)	0.34 (0.26)	0.01 (0.23)	0.24 (0.24)	0.67** (0.22)	0.57* (0.23)	0.29 (0.23)
lr_econ	0.06** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
lr_cult	0.16*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.02)
R ²	0.63	0.30	0.22	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.25
Adj. R ²	0.62	0.30	0.21	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.25
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A11: Statistical Models H1, Hungary

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.31*** (0.28)	4.89*** (0.32)	4.88*** (0.29)	5.20*** (0.30)	5.50*** (0.27)	5.76*** (0.28)	5.19*** (0.28)
gender2	0.33** (0.10)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.22* (0.10)	0.30** (0.11)	0.19 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)
gov_oppFidesz	4.59*** (0.13)	-1.11*** (0.14)	-0.88*** (0.13)	-1.25*** (0.14)	-1.07*** (0.12)	-1.13*** (0.13)	-0.99*** (0.13)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.61*** (0.12)	2.61*** (0.14)	1.19*** (0.13)	1.73*** (0.13)	1.16*** (0.12)	1.31*** (0.12)	1.15*** (0.12)
age_group2	-0.20 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.23)	0.17 (0.21)	0.53* (0.21)	0.16 (0.19)	0.08 (0.20)	0.21 (0.20)
age_group3	-0.32 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.22)	0.39 (0.20)	0.56** (0.21)	0.19 (0.19)	0.14 (0.20)	0.28 (0.19)
age_group4	0.11 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.23)	0.30 (0.21)	0.67** (0.22)	0.20 (0.19)	-0.17 (0.20)	0.18 (0.20)
age_group5	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.41 (0.21)	0.65*** (0.19)	0.98*** (0.20)	0.42* (0.18)	0.03 (0.19)	0.32 (0.19)

economy2	0.32*	0.18	0.28	0.29	0.30*	0.57***	0.45**
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
economy3	0.39*	-0.14	0.20	0.05	0.09	0.57***	0.35*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
economy4	0.38	0.24	0.07	0.01	0.56**	0.84***	0.60**
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
economy5	0.80	0.79	-0.54	-1.21	-0.05	0.64	0.24
	(0.61)	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.65)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.61)
polinterest2	0.60**	0.91***	0.41*	0.42*	0.77***	0.59**	0.62**
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
polinterest3	0.66***	0.72***	0.28	0.38	0.74***	0.64***	0.64***
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
polinterest4	0.67***	0.66**	0.26	0.33	0.82***	0.65***	0.65***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
polinterest5	0.85***	0.38	0.01	0.21	0.61**	0.45	0.22
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
lr_econ	0.03	-0.09***	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
lr_cult	0.15***	-0.02	-0.20***	-0.26***	-0.26***	-0.28***	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ess	-0.21***	-0.10	-0.01	0.06	0.14*	0.26***	0.16**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
R ²	0.63	0.30	0.22	0.34	0.31	0.34	0.26
Adj. R ²	0.63	0.30	0.21	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.25
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A13: Statistical Models H2

Complex party measure (Study 1)

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.63***	5.34***	5.88***	6.12***	5.59***	5.45***	5.46***
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.31)
gender2	0.22*	-0.07	0.11	0.17	0.11	0.04	-0.02
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
partyFidesz - KDNP	4.07***	-1.63***	-1.39***	-1.91***	-1.67***	-1.68***	-1.47***

	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
partyJobbik	-2.18***	3.84***	0.25	0.30	0.20	0.41*	0.25
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)
partyDemocratic Coalition	-2.27***	1.26***	1.65***	3.89***	1.59***	1.60***	1.22***
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
partywould not support any	-1.08***	-1.05***	-1.22***	-1.45***	-1.03***	-0.81***	-0.91***
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
partyMomentum	-2.43***	0.52	-0.07	0.09	0.95***	3.22***	0.99***
	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)
partyDialogue for Hungary	-2.23***	0.32	0.88*	1.16**	3.09***	1.99***	1.62***
	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.38)
partyHungary's Green Party	-1.65***	0.31	-0.44	-0.05	0.32	0.50	2.94***
	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)
partyHungarian Socialist Party	-1.34***	0.60	3.14***	0.96**	1.22***	0.44	0.95*
	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)
age_group2	-0.21	-0.05	0.02	0.36	0.14	0.24	0.26
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
age_group3	-0.32	-0.17	0.19	0.30	0.07	0.15	0.24
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
age_group4	0.08	-0.26	0.11	0.49*	0.15	-0.03	0.21
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
age_group5	-0.17	-0.35	0.21	0.37*	0.17	0.03	0.21
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
economy2	0.31*	0.15	0.24	0.19	0.25	0.55***	0.41**
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
economy3	0.37*	-0.14	0.17	-0.01	0.05	0.53***	0.34*
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)
economy4	0.33	0.27	0.10	0.08	0.56**	0.85***	0.62**
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
economy5	0.56	0.37	-0.34	-0.95	0.19	0.98	0.47
	(0.61)	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.60)
polinterest2	0.42*	0.76***	0.39*	0.39*	0.79***	0.63**	0.62**
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
polinterest3	0.47*	0.75***	0.39*	0.47**	0.88***	0.79***	0.76***
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
polinterest4	0.35	0.81***	0.46*	0.58**	1.07***	0.92***	0.89***

	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
polinterest5	0.48*	0.69**	0.34	0.48*	0.99***	0.84***	0.59**
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)
lrscale	0.24***	-0.06*	-0.25***	-0.28***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R ²	0.63	0.39	0.28	0.43	0.31	0.32	0.26
Adj. R ²	0.63	0.38	0.27	0.43	0.30	0.32	0.26
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A15: Statistical Models H1

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.39***	5.38***	5.96***	6.26***	5.81***	5.76***	5.71***
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)
gender2	0.25*	-0.07	0.10	0.15	0.09	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
partyFidesz - KDNP	4.07***	-1.63***	-1.39***	-1.91***	-1.67***	-1.68***	-1.47***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
partyJobbik	-2.16***	3.84***	0.24	0.29	0.18	0.39*	0.23
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)
partyDemocratic Coalition	-2.21***	1.26***	1.63***	3.85***	1.53***	1.52***	1.16***
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
partywould not support any	-1.05***	-1.06***	-1.23***	-1.46***	-1.06***	-0.84***	-0.94***
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)
partyMomentum	-2.34***	0.50	-0.10	0.04	0.87***	3.10***	0.90***
	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)
partyDialogue for Hungary	-2.15***	0.31	0.85*	1.11**	3.01***	1.88***	1.53***
	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.38)
partyHungary's Green Party	-1.67***	0.31	-0.44	-0.04	0.35	0.54	2.97***
	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)
partyHungarian Socialist Party	-1.39***	0.61	3.16***	1.00**	1.27***	0.51	1.00**
	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)
age_group2	-0.12	-0.07	-0.01	0.31	0.06	0.13	0.17
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
age_group3	-0.20	-0.19	0.15	0.22	-0.04	-0.01	0.12
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)

age_group4	0.25 (0.20)	-0.28 (0.21)	0.06 (0.20)	0.38 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.25 (0.20)	0.04 (0.20)
age_group5	0.01 (0.19)	-0.38 (0.20)	0.15 (0.19)	0.26 (0.19)	0.01 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.19)	0.03 (0.19)
economy2	0.33* (0.15)	0.15 (0.16)	0.23 (0.15)	0.18 (0.15)	0.23 (0.14)	0.52*** (0.15)	0.39** (0.15)
economy3	0.39* (0.15)	-0.15 (0.16)	0.16 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.03 (0.15)	0.50** (0.16)	0.32* (0.15)
economy4	0.34 (0.22)	0.26 (0.24)	0.09 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.56** (0.21)	0.84*** (0.22)	0.61** (0.22)
economy5	0.46 (0.60)	0.38 (0.65)	-0.31 (0.61)	-0.89 (0.60)	0.28 (0.59)	1.10 (0.61)	0.56 (0.60)
polinterest2	0.44* (0.20)	0.76*** (0.21)	0.39* (0.20)	0.38 (0.20)	0.77*** (0.19)	0.61** (0.20)	0.61** (0.20)
polinterest3	0.54** (0.18)	0.74*** (0.20)	0.36* (0.18)	0.43* (0.18)	0.81*** (0.18)	0.69*** (0.19)	0.68*** (0.18)
polinterest4	0.46* (0.19)	0.79*** (0.21)	0.42* (0.19)	0.51** (0.19)	0.97*** (0.19)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.77*** (0.19)
polinterest5	0.59** (0.23)	0.68** (0.24)	0.30 (0.23)	0.42 (0.23)	0.89*** (0.22)	0.70** (0.23)	0.47* (0.23)
lrscale	0.24*** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.22*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)
ess	-0.24*** (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.15* (0.06)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)
R ²	0.64	0.39	0.28	0.44	0.32	0.33	0.27
Adj. R ²	0.63	0.38	0.27	0.43	0.31	0.33	0.26
Num. obs.	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034	2034

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A17: Statistical Models H2

Excluding own party (Study 1)

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.37*** (0.39)	5.09*** (0.37)	5.34*** (0.31)	5.50*** (0.32)	5.24*** (0.30)	5.20*** (0.32)	5.08*** (0.31)
gender2	0.20 (0.13)	0.04 (0.12)	0.22* (0.10)	0.27* (0.11)	0.19 (0.10)	0.12 (0.11)	0.05 (0.10)

gov_oppOpposition	−1.61***	1.27***	1.09***	1.00***	1.17***	1.21***	1.12***
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
age_group2	−0.36	−0.23	0.10	0.31	0.14	0.20	0.29
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group3	−0.36	−0.26	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.15	0.27
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group4	0.07	−0.38	0.14	0.42*	0.16	−0.07	0.23
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
age_group5	−0.32	−0.38	0.40*	0.37	0.29	0.14	0.32
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)
economy2	0.45*	0.29	0.31*	0.24	0.26	0.56***	0.48**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)
economy3	0.52**	0.02	0.26	0.03	0.11	0.56***	0.43**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
economy4	0.81**	0.45	0.13	0.11	0.62**	0.84***	0.70**
	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)
economy5	0.35	0.35	−0.19	−0.76	0.23	1.02	0.54
	(0.91)	(0.76)	(0.62)	(0.63)	(0.60)	(0.63)	(0.61)
polinterest2	0.72**	0.93***	0.46*	0.52*	0.89***	0.74***	0.70***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
polinterest3	0.61**	0.68**	0.42*	0.48*	0.95***	0.85***	0.79***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
polinterest4	0.29	0.72**	0.48*	0.61**	1.19***	0.99***	0.95***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
polinterest5	−0.25	0.52	0.39	0.34	1.11***	0.86***	0.66**
	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)
lrscale	0.19***	−0.11**	−0.29***	−0.30***	−0.26***	−0.26***	−0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
gov_oppFidesz		−1.08***	−0.83***	−1.24***	−1.19***	−1.28***	−1.04***
		(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
R ²	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.16	0.14	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.21
Num. obs.	1374	1761	1995	1870	1997	1951	1996

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A19: Statistical Models H1

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.02*** (0.39)	5.07*** (0.37)	5.40*** (0.31)	5.61*** (0.33)	5.44*** (0.30)	5.49*** (0.32)	5.30*** (0.31)
gender2	0.24 (0.13)	0.04 (0.12)	0.22* (0.10)	0.26* (0.11)	0.16 (0.10)	0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.58*** (0.13)	1.28*** (0.17)	1.09*** (0.13)	1.00*** (0.14)	1.16*** (0.12)	1.19*** (0.13)	1.10*** (0.13)
age_group2	-0.23 (0.24)	-0.23 (0.24)	0.08 (0.20)	0.27 (0.21)	0.06 (0.20)	0.09 (0.21)	0.21 (0.20)
age_group3	-0.17 (0.23)	-0.25 (0.24)	0.20 (0.20)	0.18 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.21)	0.16 (0.20)
age_group4	0.34 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.24)	0.09 (0.21)	0.34 (0.21)	0.01 (0.20)	-0.29 (0.21)	0.07 (0.20)
age_group5	-0.04 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.23)	0.36 (0.19)	0.29 (0.20)	0.13 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.20)	0.16 (0.19)
economy2	0.47** (0.18)	0.29 (0.18)	0.31* (0.15)	0.23 (0.16)	0.24 (0.15)	0.53*** (0.15)	0.45** (0.15)
economy3	0.52** (0.19)	0.02 (0.19)	0.25 (0.16)	0.02 (0.17)	0.08 (0.15)	0.52** (0.16)	0.41** (0.16)
economy4	0.82** (0.30)	0.45 (0.26)	0.13 (0.23)	0.10 (0.23)	0.62** (0.22)	0.84*** (0.23)	0.70** (0.22)
economy5	-0.10 (0.91)	0.34 (0.76)	-0.16 (0.62)	-0.72 (0.63)	0.32 (0.60)	1.13 (0.63)	0.64 (0.61)
polinterest2	0.76** (0.24)	0.93*** (0.24)	0.46* (0.20)	0.51* (0.21)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.72*** (0.21)	0.69*** (0.20)
polinterest3	0.75*** (0.22)	0.69** (0.22)	0.40* (0.19)	0.44* (0.19)	0.88*** (0.18)	0.75*** (0.19)	0.71*** (0.19)
polinterest4	0.49* (0.23)	0.73** (0.23)	0.45* (0.20)	0.55** (0.21)	1.09*** (0.19)	0.85*** (0.20)	0.84*** (0.19)
polinterest5	0.00 (0.30)	0.53 (0.27)	0.36 (0.23)	0.28 (0.25)	1.01*** (0.23)	0.72** (0.24)	0.54* (0.23)
lrscale	0.19*** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.29*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.26*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)
ess	-0.38*** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)
gov_oppFidesz		-1.08*** (0.15)	-0.83*** (0.13)	-1.23*** (0.14)	-1.18*** (0.13)	-1.26*** (0.13)	-1.03*** (0.13)

R ²	0.18	0.15	0.20	0.23	0.26	0.25	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.14	0.19	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.22
Num. obs.	1374	1761	1995	1870	1997	1951	1996

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A21: Statistical Models H2

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	DK	Dialogue	Momentum	LMP
(Intercept)	2.02*** (0.39)	5.05*** (0.37)	5.38*** (0.31)	5.58*** (0.33)	5.39*** (0.30)	5.44*** (0.32)	5.25*** (0.31)
gender2	0.23 (0.13)	0.05 (0.12)	0.23* (0.10)	0.27* (0.11)	0.18 (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)	0.05 (0.10)
gov_oppOpposition	-1.58*** (0.13)	1.29*** (0.17)	1.08*** (0.13)	1.00*** (0.14)	1.14*** (0.12)	1.18*** (0.13)	1.08*** (0.13)
ess	-0.31*** (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.23** (0.08)	0.27** (0.08)	0.20* (0.08)
age_group2	-0.22 (0.24)	-0.23 (0.24)	0.07 (0.20)	0.26 (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)	0.08 (0.21)	0.20 (0.20)
age_group3	-0.15 (0.23)	-0.24 (0.24)	0.19 (0.20)	0.17 (0.21)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.21)	0.13 (0.20)
age_group4	0.36 (0.24)	-0.35 (0.24)	0.08 (0.21)	0.33 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.20)	-0.31 (0.21)	0.06 (0.20)
age_group5	-0.01 (0.23)	-0.34 (0.23)	0.35 (0.19)	0.28 (0.20)	0.11 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.20)	0.13 (0.19)
economy2	0.47** (0.18)	0.32 (0.18)	0.31* (0.15)	0.25 (0.16)	0.27 (0.15)	0.55*** (0.15)	0.46** (0.15)
economy3	0.52** (0.19)	0.06 (0.19)	0.27 (0.16)	0.06 (0.17)	0.12 (0.15)	0.57*** (0.16)	0.43** (0.16)
economy4	0.83** (0.30)	0.47 (0.26)	0.14 (0.23)	0.12 (0.23)	0.63** (0.22)	0.86*** (0.23)	0.70** (0.22)
economy5	-0.06 (0.91)	0.45 (0.77)	-0.13 (0.62)	-0.66 (0.63)	0.39 (0.60)	1.20 (0.63)	0.67 (0.61)
polinterest2	0.74** (0.24)	0.90*** (0.24)	0.46* (0.20)	0.50* (0.21)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.73*** (0.21)	0.69*** (0.20)
polinterest3	0.72**	0.64**	0.41*	0.44*	0.89***	0.77***	0.73***

	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
polinterest4	0.47*	0.69**	0.45*	0.55**	1.10***	0.87***	0.86***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
polinterest5	0.00	0.50	0.35	0.27	0.98***	0.70**	0.53*
	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)
lrscale	0.19***	-0.11**	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
gov_oppOpposition:ess	-0.18	-0.19	0.12	0.13	0.22	0.38**	0.27*
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
gov_oppFidesz		-1.10***	-0.83***	-1.24***	-1.19***	-1.27***	-1.04***
		(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
gov_oppFidesz:ess		-0.33*	-0.12	-0.24	-0.34*	-0.29*	-0.16
		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
R ²	0.18	0.16	0.20	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.23
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.15	0.19	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.22
Num. obs.	1374	1761	1995	1870	1997	1951	1996

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A23: Statistical Models H3

Regression Models (Study 2)

Table A24: Regression results baseline model Poland (baseline: undecided voters)

	PiS	PO	P2050	Left	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.47 *** (0.15)	3.90 *** (0.16)	3.52 *** (0.15)	4.96 *** (0.15)	2.36 *** (0.16)
PiS	2.62 *** (0.07)	-0.93 *** (0.08)	-0.54 *** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)
opposition	-0.97 *** (0.06)	1.22 *** (0.07)	1.01 *** (0.06)	0.49 *** (0.06)	-0.54 *** (0.07)
confederation	-0.41 *** (0.10)	-0.72 *** (0.11)	-0.73 *** (0.10)	-0.62 *** (0.10)	1.87 *** (0.10)
left-right	0.24 *** (0.02)	-0.22 *** (0.02)	-0.07 ** (0.02)	-0.48 *** (0.02)	0.20 *** (0.02)
N	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910
R2	0.65	0.40	0.27	0.32	0.26

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Controls included for gender, age (categorical), political interest, economic status and left-right position.

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left Coalition	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.43*** (0.15)	3.86*** (0.16)	3.54*** (0.15)	4.96*** (0.15)	2.27*** (0.16)
gender2	0.09 (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
gov_oppPiS	2.62*** (0.07)	-0.93*** (0.08)	-0.54*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)
gov_oppConfederation	-0.41*** (0.10)	-0.73*** (0.11)	-0.73*** (0.10)	-0.62*** (0.10)	1.86*** (0.10)
gov_oppOpposition	-0.95*** (0.06)	1.24*** (0.07)	1.00*** (0.06)	0.48*** (0.06)	-0.51*** (0.07)
age_group2	0.09 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.20* (0.09)
age_group3	0.15 (0.09)	0.24* (0.10)	0.16 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	0.21* (0.09)
age_group4	0.15	0.38***	0.15	0.11	0.15

	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group5	0.07	0.42***	0.08	0.14	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
economy2	0.10	0.00	0.25*	0.10	0.27*
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy3	0.32**	0.14	0.23*	0.25**	0.28**
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
economy4	0.38***	0.19	0.31**	0.31***	0.27**
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy5	0.45***	0.08	0.21*	0.19	0.35***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
economy6	0.67***	-0.05	0.13	0.26*	0.45***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
economy7	0.94***	-0.18	-0.18	0.03	0.27
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
polinterest2	-0.26**	-0.00	-0.01	0.05	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
polinterest3	-0.17*	-0.10	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
polinterest4	-0.23*	-0.09	-0.18	0.02	-0.34***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
polinterest5	-0.14	-0.13	-0.28*	-0.13	-0.36**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
lrscale	0.24***	-0.22***	-0.07**	-0.48***	0.20***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
wvs	-0.07**	-0.07*	0.04	0.01	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R ²	0.65	0.40	0.27	0.32	0.27
Adj. R ²	0.65	0.40	0.27	0.31	0.27
Num. obs.	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A26: Statistical Models H1

Complex party measure (Study 2)

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left Coalition	Confederation
(Intercept)	0.35*	6.23***	4.39***	5.16***	1.89***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
gender2	0.07	0.12*	0.15**	0.17***	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
partyConfederation	0.68***	-2.77***	-1.23***	-1.18***	2.46***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
partyDon't know	1.25***	-1.84***	-0.38***	-0.30***	0.71***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyLaw and Justice (PiS)	3.71***	-2.93***	-1.06***	-0.62***	0.52***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyPoland 2050	0.24**	-1.47***	1.17***	-0.31***	0.16*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyThe Left	0.32**	-1.82***	-0.32**	0.98***	-0.21
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
partywould not support any	0.84***	-2.43***	-0.85***	-0.87***	0.35***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group2	0.11	-0.07	0.00	-0.05	0.17
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
age_group3	0.16	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.18
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
age_group4	0.15	0.16	0.11	0.20*	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group5	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.23**	-0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
economy2	0.10	0.04	0.23*	0.12	0.28*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy3	0.30**	0.16	0.26**	0.23*	0.27*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
economy4	0.37***	0.16	0.32***	0.29**	0.25*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy5	0.43***	0.05	0.22*	0.18	0.31**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy6	0.65***	-0.02	0.18	0.22	0.43***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)

economy7	0.93***	-0.17	-0.19	0.04	0.25
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
polinterest2	-0.29***	-0.07	-0.02	0.04	-0.16
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
polinterest3	-0.20**	-0.12	-0.02	-0.04	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
polinterest4	-0.27**	-0.16	-0.09	-0.03	-0.40***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
polinterest5	-0.17	-0.29*	-0.18	-0.17	-0.44***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
lrscale	0.25***	-0.24***	-0.14***	-0.41***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R ²	0.65	0.49	0.35	0.36	0.27
Adj. R ²	0.65	0.49	0.34	0.35	0.26
Num. obs.	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A29: Statistical Models H1

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left Coalition	Confederation
(Intercept)	0.32*	6.20***	4.41***	5.16***	1.83***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
gender2	0.07	0.12*	0.15**	0.17***	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
partyConfederation	0.66***	-2.79***	-1.22***	-1.18***	2.42***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
partyDon't know	1.23***	-1.86***	-0.37***	-0.30***	0.68***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyLaw and Justice (PiS)	3.70***	-2.94***	-1.05***	-0.62***	0.50***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyPoland 2050	0.23**	-1.48***	1.17***	-0.31***	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyThe Left	0.32**	-1.81***	-0.32**	0.98***	-0.21
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
partywould not support any	0.83***	-2.45***	-0.84***	-0.87***	0.31**

	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group2	0.11	-0.07	0.00	-0.05	0.17
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
age_group3	0.17*	0.07	0.13	0.13	0.19*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
age_group4	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.20*	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group5	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.23**	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
economy2	0.10	0.03	0.23*	0.12	0.27*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy3	0.31**	0.17	0.25**	0.23*	0.28**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
economy4	0.37***	0.17	0.31***	0.29**	0.26**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy5	0.45***	0.06	0.21*	0.18	0.34***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy6	0.67***	-0.01	0.17	0.22	0.46***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
economy7	0.94***	-0.16	-0.19	0.04	0.27
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
polinterest2	-0.27**	-0.05	-0.03	0.04	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
polinterest3	-0.19*	-0.11	-0.03	-0.04	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
polinterest4	-0.24*	-0.13	-0.12	-0.04	-0.33**
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
polinterest5	-0.13	-0.26*	-0.21	-0.17	-0.36**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
lrscale	0.25***	-0.23***	-0.14***	-0.41***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
wvs	-0.07**	-0.07**	0.05*	0.00	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R ²	0.65	0.49	0.35	0.36	0.28
Adj. R ²	0.65	0.49	0.35	0.35	0.27

Num. obs.	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910
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*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A31: Statistical Models H2

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left Coalition	Confederation
(Intercept)	0.39*	6.10***	4.35***	5.16***	1.90***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
gender2	0.07	0.12**	0.15**	0.17***	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
partyConfederation	0.69***	-2.78***	-1.23***	-1.21***	2.45***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
partyDon't know	1.22***	-1.83***	-0.35***	-0.30***	0.66***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyLaw and Justice (PiS)	3.68***	-2.91***	-1.03***	-0.63***	0.47***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyPoland 2050	0.22**	-1.46***	1.19***	-0.32***	0.13
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
partyThe Left	0.31**	-1.77***	-0.29**	0.97***	-0.21
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
partywould not support any	0.80***	-2.46***	-0.84***	-0.89***	0.33***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
wvs	-0.20***	0.08	0.18***	-0.01	-0.33***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
age_group2	0.11	-0.08	-0.00	-0.05	0.18*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
age_group3	0.17*	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.19*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
age_group4	0.17	0.16	0.09	0.19*	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group5	0.10	0.16	0.12	0.23**	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
economy2	0.09	0.03	0.23*	0.12	0.26*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy3	0.32**	0.14	0.24*	0.23*	0.29**

	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
economy4	0.38***	0.14	0.30***	0.29**	0.27**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy5	0.46***	0.04	0.20*	0.17	0.35***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
economy6	0.65***	0.02	0.18	0.22	0.45***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
economy7	0.91***	-0.09	-0.16	0.04	0.25
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
polinterest2	-0.27**	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	-0.14
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
polinterest3	-0.18*	-0.09	-0.02	-0.04	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
polinterest4	-0.23*	-0.12	-0.11	-0.04	-0.33***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
polinterest5	-0.13	-0.27*	-0.21	-0.17	-0.36**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
lrscale	0.23***	-0.21***	-0.13***	-0.41***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
partyConfederation:wvs	0.29**	-0.12	-0.23*	-0.12	0.43***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
partyDon't know:wvs	0.15	-0.18*	-0.14	0.02	0.21*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
partyLaw and Justice (PiS):wvs	0.39***	-0.54***	-0.31***	0.02	0.31***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
partyPoland 2050:wvs	0.07	0.05	-0.06	0.10	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
partyThe Left:wvs	-0.02	-0.16	-0.10	0.03	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
partywould not support any:wvs	0.10	-0.29**	-0.20*	-0.03	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
R ²	0.66	0.50	0.35	0.36	0.28
Adj. R ²	0.65	0.50	0.35	0.35	0.28
Num. obs.	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Figure A5: Statistical Models H3

Table A27: Regression results democracy model Poland (baseline: undecided voters)

	PiS	PO	P2050	Left	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.49 *** (0.15)	3.77 *** (0.16)	3.50 *** (0.15)	4.96 *** (0.15)	2.33 *** (0.16)
PiS	2.62 *** (0.07)	-0.91 *** (0.08)	-0.54 *** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)
opposition	-0.95 *** (0.06)	1.23 *** (0.07)	1.00 *** (0.06)	0.49 *** (0.06)	-0.51 *** (0.07)
confederation	-0.37 *** (0.10)	-0.73 *** (0.11)	-0.75 *** (0.10)	-0.64 *** (0.10)	1.90 *** (0.11)
left-right	0.22 *** (0.02)	-0.20 *** (0.02)	-0.06 ** (0.02)	-0.48 *** (0.02)	0.19 *** (0.02)
Democracy	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.14 * (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Dem*PiS	0.26 ** (0.08)	-0.35 *** (0.09)	-0.17 * (0.09)	0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)
Dem*Opp	-0.12 (0.06)	0.24 *** (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.25 *** (0.07)
Dem*Conf	0.16 (0.10)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.14 (0.11)
N	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910
R2	0.65	0.41	0.28	0.32	0.28

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Controls included for gender, age (categorical), political interest, economic status and left-right position.

Excluding own party (Study 2)

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.55*** (0.17)	4.11*** (0.17)	3.60*** (0.16)	4.64*** (0.15)	2.42*** (0.17)
gender2	0.10 (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
gov_oppConfederation	-0.32** (0.10)	-0.67*** (0.10)	-0.67*** (0.10)	-0.66*** (0.10)	
gov_oppOpposition	-0.90*** (0.06)	0.54*** (0.07)	0.53*** (0.07)	0.36*** (0.06)	-0.53*** (0.07)
age_group2	0.11 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.24* (0.10)
age_group3	0.21* (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.14 (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)	0.23* (0.10)
age_group4	0.17 (0.10)	0.16 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)	0.24* (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)
age_group5	0.02 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.28** (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
economy2	0.14 (0.11)	0.05 (0.13)	0.34** (0.12)	0.06 (0.11)	0.27* (0.12)
economy3	0.43*** (0.10)	0.19 (0.12)	0.39*** (0.11)	0.21* (0.10)	0.23* (0.11)
economy4	0.49*** (0.10)	0.22* (0.11)	0.45*** (0.10)	0.30** (0.10)	0.26* (0.11)
economy5	0.45*** (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)	0.37*** (0.11)	0.15 (0.10)	0.34** (0.11)
economy6	0.62*** (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)	0.27* (0.13)	0.21 (0.12)	0.41** (0.13)
economy7	0.87*** (0.24)	-0.29 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.18)	0.03 (0.17)	0.27 (0.19)
polinterest2	-0.37*** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.19* (0.09)
polinterest3	-0.26** (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)
polinterest4	-0.51*** (0.08)	-0.32** (0.08)	-0.16 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.48*** (0.08)

	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
polinterest5	-0.54***	-0.56***	-0.30*	-0.13	-0.54***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
lrscale	0.21***	-0.24***	-0.12***	-0.42***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
gov_oppPiS		-0.78***	-0.50***	-0.11	-0.05
		(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
R ²	0.22	0.29	0.19	0.26	0.12
Adj. R ²	0.22	0.28	0.19	0.26	0.11
Num. obs.	2212	2328	2456	2735	2690

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A34: Statistical Models H1

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left Coalition	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.51***	4.05***	3.63***	4.65***	2.32***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
gender2	0.10	0.23***	0.22***	0.20***	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
gov_oppConfederation	-0.32**	-0.67***	-0.66***	-0.66***	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	
gov_oppOpposition	-0.88***	0.56***	0.51***	0.36***	-0.50***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
age_group2	0.11	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.23*
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group3	0.22*	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.24*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group4	0.18	0.17	0.12	0.24*	0.20
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
age_group5	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.27**	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
economy2	0.14	0.04	0.35**	0.06	0.26*
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
economy3	0.44***	0.20	0.38***	0.21*	0.25*
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)

economy4	0.49*** (0.10)	0.23* (0.11)	0.45*** (0.10)	0.30** (0.10)	0.27** (0.11)
economy5	0.48*** (0.11)	0.08 (0.12)	0.36*** (0.11)	0.15 (0.10)	0.38*** (0.11)
economy6	0.64*** (0.15)	-0.05 (0.14)	0.26* (0.13)	0.21 (0.12)	0.44*** (0.13)
economy7	0.86*** (0.24)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.18)	0.03 (0.17)	0.30 (0.19)
polinterest2	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.09)
polinterest3	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)
polinterest4	-0.47*** (0.11)	-0.28* (0.11)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.40*** (0.11)
polinterest5	-0.48*** (0.14)	-0.51*** (0.14)	-0.32* (0.12)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.46*** (0.13)
lrscale	0.21*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.42*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)
wvs	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)
gov_oppPiS		-0.77*** (0.08)	-0.50*** (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)
R ²	0.23	0.29	0.19	0.26	0.13
Adj. R ²	0.22	0.28	0.19	0.26	0.12
Num. obs.	2212	2328	2456	2735	2690

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A36: Statistical Models H2

	PiS	KO	P2050	Left Coalition	Confederation
(Intercept)	1.53*** (0.17)	3.99*** (0.17)	3.58*** (0.16)	4.64*** (0.16)	2.37*** (0.17)
gender2	0.10 (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
gov_oppConfederation		-0.29**	-0.67***	-0.69***	-0.69***

	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	
gov_oppOpposition	-0.89***	0.56***	0.50***	0.36***	-0.51***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
wvs	-0.05	-0.12*	0.03	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
age_group2	0.11	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.25*
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group3	0.22*	0.10	0.13	0.18*	0.25**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
age_group4	0.20	0.17	0.11	0.24*	0.22*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
age_group5	0.05	0.07	0.11	0.27**	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
economy2	0.13	0.04	0.35**	0.06	0.26*
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
economy3	0.44***	0.18	0.38***	0.21*	0.27*
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy4	0.50***	0.20	0.44***	0.30**	0.30**
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy5	0.48***	0.06	0.36***	0.15	0.40***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
economy6	0.63***	-0.04	0.28*	0.21	0.44***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
economy7	0.85***	-0.22	-0.03	0.03	0.27
	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)
polinterest2	-0.35***	-0.03	-0.02	0.06	-0.16
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
polinterest3	-0.24**	-0.12	-0.01	-0.03	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
polinterest4	-0.46***	-0.27*	-0.18	-0.01	-0.42***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
polinterest5	-0.48***	-0.52***	-0.32**	-0.14	-0.46***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
lrscale	0.21***	-0.22***	-0.11***	-0.42***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
gov_oppConfederation:wvs	0.16	0.09	-0.08	-0.14	

	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	
gov_oppOpposition:wvs	-0.12	0.20**	0.14*	0.04	-0.25***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
gov_oppPiS		-0.77***	-0.50***	-0.11	-0.06
		(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
gov_oppPiS:wvs		-0.28**	-0.15	0.01	0.03
		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
R ²	0.23	0.30	0.20	0.26	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.22	0.29	0.19	0.26	0.13
Num. obs.	2212	2328	2456	2735	2690

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A38: Statistical Models H3