Depolarizing effect of strategic anticonformity – insights from the three-state 𝑞-voter model with bounded confidence
Department of Management Systems, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology
13 Sep 2023, 11:45–12:10
Engaging with dissenting views, fostering productive disagreements, or strategic anticonformity can bring benefits to organizations by challenging the status quo. However, a key question arises regarding whether such strategic anticonformity ultimately leads to social polarization, which is an undesirable outcome. Previous research in computational social science indicates that conformity combined with homophily enhances polarization, while anticonformity towards dissimilar individuals further escalates it. However, it is worth noting that anticonformity is not limited to dissimilar individuals and can manifest in various forms, one of which is asserting uniqueness. This form of anticonformity, which can be used strategically, is the focus of our work. Our aim is to answer the question of whether local anticonformity, in the form of asserting uniqueness, can lead to a global consensus. In this talk, we will present the first part of our ongoing project, which answers the above question within the three-state q-voter model with anticonformity and bounded confidence. The model analysis is conducted on different networks, including a complete graph (Lipiecki & Sznajd-Weron, 2022), as well as networks with two-community structures, and empirical datasets such as the Enron email network and the GitHub social network (Lipiecki & Sznajd-Weron, 2023). The results obtained from analyzing the model on various networks consistently support the conclusion that strategic anticonformity in the form of asserting uniqueness can indeed lead to a global consensus by depolarizing society. This finding highlights the potential of local disagreements to facilitate broader consensus. By leveraging strategic anticonformity, organizations can promote constructive dialogue, ultimately leading to a more cohesive and consensus-driven society.
Acknowledgment: This research was funded by the National Science Center (NCN, Poland) through grant no. 2019/35/B/HS6/02530.
Lipiecki, A. & Sznajd-Weron, K. (2022) Polarization in the three-state 𝑞-voter model with anticonformity and bounded confidence, Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 165, 112809
Lipiecki, A. & Sznajd-Weron, K. (2023) Depolarizing effect of strategic anticonformity – insights from the three-state 𝑞-voter model with bounded confidence on networks, working paper