Reputation, Trust and Cooperation

“Tit for Tat”, a strategy in repeated game theoretical interactions, is a prime example to explain how inherent attributes of agents, such as cooperation or defection, shape social behavior. Reputation generates a strong signal for firms and online users to develop trust in information provided by their counterparty.

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Should the government reward cooperation? Insights from an agent-based model of wealth redistribution

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Quantifying the importance of firms by means of reputation and network control

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Optimal migration promotes the outbreak of cooperation in heterogeneous populations

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A tunable mechanism for identifying trusted nodes in large scale distributed networks

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7th International Conference on Collaborative Computing (CollaborateCom 2011), Orlando, FL, USA - 2011

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Trust as the basis of coalition formation in electronic marketplaces

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Emotions in product reviews – empirics and models

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Dilemmas of partial cooperation

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Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

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Personalised and Dynamic Trust in Social Networks

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Coping with information overload through trust-based networks

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Alternating cooperation strategies in a route choice game: Theory, experiments, and effects of a learning scenario

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When does defection pay? The stability of institutional arrangements in clusters

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Kerstin Press

Impact of Trust on the Performance of a Recommendation System in a Social Network

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