Reputation, Trust and Cooperation

“Tit for Tat”, a strategy in repeated game theoretical interactions, is a prime example to explain how inherent attributes of agents, such as cooperation or defection, shape social behavior. Reputation generates a strong signal for firms and online users to develop trust in information provided by their counterparty.

Related Publications

Quantifying the importance of firms by means of reputation and network control

Frontiers in Big Data - 2021

Yan Zhang and Frank Schweitzer

Modeling User Reputation in Online Social Networks: The Role of Costs, Benefits, and Reciprocity

Entropy - 2020

Frank Schweitzer, Pavlin Mavrodiev, A. M. Seufert and David Garcia

The interdependence of corporate reputation and ownership: A network approach to quantify reputation

Royal Society Open Science - 2019

Yan Zhang and Frank Schweitzer

Understanding Popularity, Reputation, and Social Influence in the Twitter Society

Policy & Internet - 2017

David Garcia, Pavlin Mavrodiev, Daniele Casati and Frank Schweitzer

How can social herding enhance cooperation?

ACS - Advances in Complex Systems - 2013

Frank Schweitzer, Pavlin Mavrodiev and Claudio Juan Tessone

Moving recommender systems from on-line commerce to retail stores

Information Systems and e-Business Management - 2012

Frank Edward Walter, Stefano Battiston, Mahir Yildirim and Frank Schweitzer

Optimal migration promotes the outbreak of cooperation in heterogeneous populations

ACS - Advances in Complex Systems - 2012

Frank Schweitzer and Laxmidhar Behera

A tunable mechanism for identifying trusted nodes in large scale distributed networks

Proceedings of 11th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom 2012) - 2012

Joydeep Chandra, Ingo Scholtes, Niloy Ganguly and Frank Schweitzer

Tweetgames: A framework for Twitter-based collaborative social online games

7th International Conference on Collaborative Computing (CollaborateCom 2011), Orlando, FL, USA - 2011

Markus Esch, Aleksandrina Kovacheva, Ingo Scholtes and Steffen Rothkugel

Trust as the basis of coalition formation in electronic marketplaces

ACS - Advances in Complex Systems - 2011

Frank Edward Walter

Emotions in product reviews – empirics and models

IEEE International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk, and Trust, and IEEE International Conference on Social Computing, PASSAT/SocialCom - 2011

David Garcia and Frank Schweitzer

Dilemmas of partial cooperation

Evolution - 2010

Hans - Ulrich Stark

Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Physical Review E - 2009

Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, Gyoergy Szabo and Hans Ulrich Stark

Personalised and Dynamic Trust in Social Networks

Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Recommender systems-RecSys '09 - 2009

Frank Edward Walter, Stefano Battiston and Frank Schweitzer

Coping with information overload through trust-based networks

Managing Complexity: Insights, concepts, Applications - 2008

Frank Edward Walter, Stefano Battiston and Frank Schweitzer

Alternating cooperation strategies in a route choice game: Theory, experiments, and effects of a learning scenario

Games, Rationality, and Behaviour - 2008

Hans Ulrich Stark, Dirk Helbing, Martin Schoenhof and Janusz A. Holyst

When does defection pay? The stability of institutional arrangements in clusters

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - 2007

Kerstin Press

Impact of Trust on the Performance of a Recommendation System in a Social Network

Proceedings of the Workshop on Trust at the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS'06) - 2006

Stefano Battiston, Frank Edward Walter and Frank Schweitzer